Tài liệu USFA-TR-022/May 1988: Interstate Bank Building Fire pptx

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Interstate Bank Building Fire
Los Angeles, California
Investigated by: J. Gordon Routley
This is Report 022 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted
by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-8-4321 to the United
States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Homeland
Security
Department of Homeland Security
United States Fire Administration
National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration
Mission Statement
As an entity of the Department of Homeland
Security, the mission of the USFA is to re-
duce life and economic losses due to re
and related emergencies, through leader-
ship, advocacy, coordination, and support.
We serve the Nation independently, in co-
ordination with other Federal agencies,
and in partnership with re protection and
emergency service communities. With a
commitment to excellence, we provide pub-
lic education, training, technology, and data
initiatives.
Homeland
Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS
OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
BUILDING DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
THE FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
INITIAL STAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
EXPANDING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
SEARCH AND RESCUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
MEDICAL GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
HELICOPTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FIREFIGHTER SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FALLING GLASS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SPRINKLERS AND STANDPIPE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ELEVATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
SALVAGE AND PROPERTY LOSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
APPENDIX A: Twelfth-oor Plan Showing Area of Origin and Location of Fatality . . . . . . . . 16
APPENDIX B: Incident Command Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
APPENDIX C: Site Map, Showing Command Post, Operations Bases, and Medical Group . . . 18
APPENDIX D: Vertical Cross-section of Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
APPENDIX E: Copies of Photographs Provided by the Los Angeles City Fire Department . . . 20

1
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK BUILDING FIRE
Los Angeles, California
May 4, 1988
Local Contacts: Donald F. Anthony
Deputy Chief
Thomas E. McMaster
Battalion Chief
Los Angeles City Fire Department
200 North Main Street
Los Angeles, California
(213) 485-6237
OVERVIEW
On Wednesday, May 4, and continuing into May 5, 1988, the Los Angeles City Fire Department
responded to and extinguished the most challenging and difcult highrise re in the city’s history.
The re destroyed four oors and damaged a fth oor of the modern 62 story First Interstate Bank
building in downtown Los Angeles. The re claimed one life, injured approximately 35 occupants
and 14 re personnel, and resulted in a property loss of over 50 million dollars.
This was one of the most destructive highrise res in recent United States history. The re pre-
sented the greatest potential for the “Towering Inferno” scenario of any U. S. re experience and
was controlled only through the massive and dedicated manual re suppression efforts of a large
metropolitan re department. It demonstrated the absolute need for automatic sprinklers to provide
protection for tall buildings.
A total of 383 Los Angeles City Fire Department members from 64 companies, nearly one-half of
the on-duty force of the entire city, were involved in ghting the re, mounting an offensive attack
via four stairways. This operation involved many unusual challenges, but is most notable for the
sheer magnitude of the re and the fact that the re was successfully controlled by interior suppres-
sion efforts. To cover areas of the city protected by units called to the re, 20 companies from Los
Angeles County and four companies from surrounding jurisdictions were brought in under mutual
aid agreements.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
Issues Comments
Occupancy 62-story highrise ofce building.
Construction Steel frame; exterior of glass and aluminum.
Unusually good application of re resistive coating helped maintain structural integrity in re.
Delayed Reporting Building security and maintenance personnel delayed notifying re department for 15 minutes
after rst evidence of re.
Smoke detectors on several oors had been activated and reset a number of times before
reporting to re department.
A maintenance employee died while trying to investigate source of alarms prior to calling re
department.
Automatic Fire Sprinklers Sprinkler system was installed in 90 percent of the building, including on re oors; valves
controlling the systems had been closed, awaiting installation of water ow alarms.
Interior Design and Contents Large open area with readily combustible contents contributed to quick re growth.
System Failures Main re pumps had been shut down, reducing available water pressure for initial attack.
Radio communications were overtaxed and disrupted by building’s steel frame.
Fire and water damaged telephone circuits making them unusable.
Sound-powered emergency phone system in building was ineffective.
Fireghter Safety Fourteen reghters sustained minor injuries in this operation, out of a total of nearly 400
involved.
Use of protective hoods was effective in preventing neck and ear burns and allowing reght-
ers to penetrate re oors.
Attack crews used only 30-minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to control their
time on involved re oors and avoid over fatigue.
The Los Angeles City Fire Department attention to physical tness is credited with minimizing
effects of fatigue.
PREFACE
The Los Angeles City Fire Department provided information necessary to prepare this report through
the generous cooperation of Chief Engineer and General Manager Donald O. Manning and Deputy
Chief Donald F. Anthony.
The report is based heavily on information from a comprehensive report prepared by Battalion Chief
Thomas E. McMaster, who was assigned to be the Los Angeles City Fire Department’s historian for
this re.
The Los Angeles City Fire Department has the policy of assigning a chief ofcer to be the ofcial
historian for major res. The purpose of this assignment is to document the facts surrounding
signicant res for informational and training purposes. Through a careful analysis of the cause,
progress, and extinguishment of major res, the department identies the need for improved stan-
dard operating procedures and legislation. The documentation effort is a comprehensive analysis of
USFA-TR-022/May 1988 3
the re with pertinent observations and recommendations which will be placed on the agenda of
various re department committees for further consideration.
BUILDING DESCRIPTION
The First Interstate Bank building, the tallest in the city (and the State of California), is located at the
intersection of Wilshire Boulevard and Hope Street in downtown Los Angeles. It was built in 1973,
one year before a highrise sprinkler ordinance went into effect, and had sprinkler protection only
in the basement, garage, and underground pedestrian tunnel. The 62-story tower measures 124
feet by 184 feet (22,816 square feet). It contains approximately 17,500 net square feet of ofce
space per oor, built around a central core. It is occupied primarily by the headquarters of the bank
corporation with several oors occupied by other tenants. Approximately 4,000 people work in the
building.
The tower contains four main stairways (numbered 5, 5-A, 6, and 6-A in the 12th-oor plan in
Appendix A). Stairs 6 and 6-A are enclosed within a common shaft, and stairway 5-A has a pres-
surized vestibule separating each oor with the stair shaft. Each stairway contains a combination
standpipe with a pressure reducing valve at each landing. The building is topped with a helicopter
landing pad.
The building has a structural steel frame, protected by a sprayed-on re protective coating, with steel
oor pans and lightweight concrete decking. The exterior curtain walls are glass and aluminum.
A complete automatic sprinkler system costing 3.5 million dollars was being installed in the build-
ing at the time of the re. The installation was not required by codes at the time the owners decided
to provide increased re protection for the building. The project was approximately 90 percent com-
plete, with work in progress at the time of the incident. The piping and sprinkler heads had been
installed throughout the ve re oors and connected to the standpipe supply. However, a decision
had been made to activate the system only on completion of the entire project, when connections
would be made to the re alarm systems, so the valves controlling the sprinklers on completed oors
were closed.
THE FIRE
The re originated in an open-plan ofce area in the southeast quadrant of the 12th oor. (See
Appendix A.) The area of origin contained modular ofce furniture with numerous personal com-
puters and terminals used by securities trading personnel. The cause is thought to be electrical in
origin, but the precise source of ignition was not determined. The re extended to the entire open
area and several ofce enclosures to fully involve the 12th oor, except for the passenger elevator
lobby, which was protected by automatic closing re doors.
The re extended to oors above, primarily via the outer walls of the building; windows broke and
ames penetrated behind the spandrel panels around the ends of the oor slabs. The curtain wall
construction creates separations between the end of the oor slab and the exterior curtain wall. (For
a discussion of this type of re spread see National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Journal,
May/June 1988, pages 75-84.)
There was heavy exposure of ames to the windows on successive oors as the re extended upward
from the 12th to 16th oors. The ames were estimated to be lapping 30 feet up the face of the
building. The curtain walls, including windows, spandrel panels, and mullions, were almost com-
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
pletely destroyed by the re. There were no “eyebrows” to stop the exterior vertical spread, and
reground commanders were concerned about the possibility of the re “lapping” higher to involve
additional oors.
Minor re extension also occurred via poke-through penetrations for electricity and communica-
tions, via heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) shafts, and via heat conduction through
the oor slabs. A minor re occurred in a storeroom on the 27th oor, ignited by re products
escaping from an HVAC shaft that originated on the 12th oor. This re self-extinguished due to
oxygen deciency, but could have greatly complicated the situation if it had continued to burn. The
secondary extensions were minor compared to the perimeter re spread at the curtain walls.
The re extended at a rate estimated at 45 minutes per oor and burned intensely for approximately
90 minutes on each level. This resulted in two oors being heavily involved at any point during the
re. The upward extension was stopped at the 16th oor level, after completely destroying four and
one-half oors of the building.
INITIAL STAGES
At 2222 on the night of the re, the building’s two re pumps were shut down by the sprinkler
contractor, and the combination standpipe system was drained down to the 58th oor level to facili-
tate connecting the new sprinkler system to the standpipe at that level. Three minutes later, at 2225,
employees of the sprinkler system contractor heard glass falling and saw light smoke at the ceiling
level on the 5th oor. A manual alarm was pulled but sounded for only a few seconds. It is believed
that the alarm was silenced by security personnel on the ground oor.
At 2230, a smoke detector on the 12th oor was activated and was reset by security personnel. At
2232, three additional smoke detectors on the 12th oor were activated and were again reset by
security personnel. At 2234, four smoke detectors on the 12th oor were activated and reset.
At 2236, multiple smoke detector alarms from the 12th to the 30th oors activated. A maintenance
employee took a service elevator to the 12th oor to investigate the source of the alarms. The
employee died when the elevator door opened onto a burning lobby on the 12th oor.
FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS
At 2237, the re department received three separate 9-1-1 calls from people outside of the First
Interstate building reporting a re on the upper oors. At 2238, a Category “B” assignment was
dispatched consisting of Task Forces 9 and 10, Engine 3, Squad 4, and Battalion 1 – a total of 30
personnel. (A task force in Los Angeles consists of 10 personnel operating two pumpers and one
ladder truck.)
The rst report of the re from inside the building was received at 2241, as the rst due companies
were arriving at the scene. While en route, Battalion 1 had observed and reported a large “loom-up”
in the general area of the building. As he arrived on the scene, the battalion chief observed the entire
east side and three-fourths of the south side of the 12th oor fully involved with re. Battalion Chief
Don Cate immediately called for ve additional task forces, ve engine companies, and ve battalion
chiefs. This was followed quickly by a request for an additional ve task forces, ve engine compa-
nies, and ve battalion chiefs, providing a total response of over 200 personnel within ve minutes
of the rst alarm. Two re department helicopters were also dispatched.